Login
Create Account
Canadian Store (CAD)
You are currently shopping in our Canadian store. For orders outside of Canada, please switch to our international store. International and US orders are billed in US dollars.
 |
Regulatory Failure and RenewalThe Evolution of the Natural Monopoly Contract, Second Edition |
eBook Available
How the failure to protect private property from the coercive power of the state in Canada has led to a breakdown in regulation and in the creation of public enterprises.
Regulatory Failure and Renewal develops a framework to understand the choice of regulatory instrument used in Canada for natural monopolies such as telephone companies, water utilities, streetcars, hydroelectricity, and railways from the 1880s to the 1930s.
Using the transaction-cost literature pioneered by Oliver Williamson, John Baldwin examines the nature of contractual failure in Canada in natural monopoly cases, asking why initial forms of contracts between the state and private enterprise failed and why this failure so often resulted in the use of public enterprise. Baldwin outlines early attempts to deal with natural monopolies - from the use of a franchise contract to regulatory tribunals and finally to public enterprise - and compares Canadian experiences to US approaches, which turned more frequently to regulatory tribunals. This difference is due to Canada’s more limited constraints on the state’s ability to exercise coercive power, which sometimes leads to contractual failure that results in replacing franchise and regulatory frameworks with public enterprise.
Regulatory Failure and Renewal demonstrates that public enterprise arose not so much as part of a purposive choice but because of reoccurring failures in the contractual process between the Canadian state and private enterprise.
Using the transaction-cost literature pioneered by Oliver Williamson, John Baldwin examines the nature of contractual failure in Canada in natural monopoly cases, asking why initial forms of contracts between the state and private enterprise failed and why this failure so often resulted in the use of public enterprise. Baldwin outlines early attempts to deal with natural monopolies - from the use of a franchise contract to regulatory tribunals and finally to public enterprise - and compares Canadian experiences to US approaches, which turned more frequently to regulatory tribunals. This difference is due to Canada’s more limited constraints on the state’s ability to exercise coercive power, which sometimes leads to contractual failure that results in replacing franchise and regulatory frameworks with public enterprise.
Regulatory Failure and Renewal demonstrates that public enterprise arose not so much as part of a purposive choice but because of reoccurring failures in the contractual process between the Canadian state and private enterprise.
Details
Part of the Carleton Library Series (number 260 in series)
168 Pages, 8.125 x 10.5
ISBN 9780228011811
May 2022
Formats: Cloth, Paperback, eBook
John R. Baldwin taught in the economics department at Queen’s University, worked at the Economic Council of Canada, and is the former head of the Economic Analysis Research Group at Statistics Canada.
Foreword to the New Edition vii
Stanley Winer
Introduction to the New Edition xi
Ian Keay
Preface xxxv
Foreword xxxvii
Judith Maxwell
1 Introduction 1
2 A Theory of Natural Monopoly Regulation 5
Natural Monopoly and the Need for a Regulatory Agent 5
The Cause of Transactions Failures 6
Transactions Failure and Regulation 7
Conclusion 9
3 The Transition from Franchise Contract to Regulatory Tribunal in the United States 11
The Emergence of the Utility Sector 11
The Early Evolution of the Regulatory System 13
Regulation as a Contract 13
Flexible Regulatory Contracts 15
Property Rights and the Role of the Judiciary 16
Conclusion 19
4 Public Enterprise in the Canadian Railway Industry 21
The Conventional View 22
The Contractual Process and Transactions Failure 22
Moral Hazard and Regulatory Failure 23
The Demise of the Grank Trunk 26
Confiscation During the Expropriation Process 33
Conclusion 34
5 Judicial Constraints in Canada and the Evolution of the Regulatory Process 37
The Role of the Judiciary in Canada 37
Common Law and Confiscation 38
The Evolution of Rulings on Regulation and Confiscation 38
The Evolution of Regulation via Independent Tribunal 40
Nova Scotia 41
New Brunswick 49
Alberta 50
Conclusion 51
6 The Evolution of the Regulatory Contract
in the Nineteenth Century 53
Water and Municipalization 53
Voluntary Regulation in the Gas Industry 56
Tramways and Regulation by Contract 58
Conclusion 60
7 British Columbia: Honour and Circumstance; Regulation by Independent Tribunal Avoided 63
Historical Development (1896-1917) 63
Renegotiation of the Regulatory Contract 65
Conclusion 66
8 Bell Canada: Business Strategy and Federal Protection 69
Historical Development 69
Conclusion 72
9 Manitoba: Public Enterprise Accompanied by Regulation 73
The Expropriation of Bell Canada’s Manitoba Operations 73
Competition between Private and Public Utilities in the Electrical Industry 75
Conclusion 79
10 The Creation of Ontario Hydro: The Franchise Contract Repudiated 83
Historical Development 83
The Demise of the Franchise Contract 83
The Private Sector 86
Emergence of Ontario Hydro 87
Opportunism 88
The Conmee Clause 88
The Power Generating Clause 89
Protection from Judicial Review 90
The Disposition of the Toronto Electric Light Company and the Toronto Railway Company 91
Conclusion 93
11 Utilities in Quebec from 1890 to 1935: Unfettered Development in Electricity Accompanied by Cost of Service Regulation for the Transit Industry 95
Historical Developments in Montral 95
Regulatory History 97
The Evolution of the Montreal Tramways Contract 98
Quebec City: 1929-35 99
Conclusion 100
12 Conclusion 103
The Choice of Regulatory Instrument 103
The Theory of Instrument Choice 105
Notes 109
List of Tables 117
Bibliography 119
Stanley Winer
Introduction to the New Edition xi
Ian Keay
Preface xxxv
Foreword xxxvii
Judith Maxwell
1 Introduction 1
2 A Theory of Natural Monopoly Regulation 5
Natural Monopoly and the Need for a Regulatory Agent 5
The Cause of Transactions Failures 6
Transactions Failure and Regulation 7
Conclusion 9
3 The Transition from Franchise Contract to Regulatory Tribunal in the United States 11
The Emergence of the Utility Sector 11
The Early Evolution of the Regulatory System 13
Regulation as a Contract 13
Flexible Regulatory Contracts 15
Property Rights and the Role of the Judiciary 16
Conclusion 19
4 Public Enterprise in the Canadian Railway Industry 21
The Conventional View 22
The Contractual Process and Transactions Failure 22
Moral Hazard and Regulatory Failure 23
The Demise of the Grank Trunk 26
Confiscation During the Expropriation Process 33
Conclusion 34
5 Judicial Constraints in Canada and the Evolution of the Regulatory Process 37
The Role of the Judiciary in Canada 37
Common Law and Confiscation 38
The Evolution of Rulings on Regulation and Confiscation 38
The Evolution of Regulation via Independent Tribunal 40
Nova Scotia 41
New Brunswick 49
Alberta 50
Conclusion 51
6 The Evolution of the Regulatory Contract
in the Nineteenth Century 53
Water and Municipalization 53
Voluntary Regulation in the Gas Industry 56
Tramways and Regulation by Contract 58
Conclusion 60
7 British Columbia: Honour and Circumstance; Regulation by Independent Tribunal Avoided 63
Historical Development (1896-1917) 63
Renegotiation of the Regulatory Contract 65
Conclusion 66
8 Bell Canada: Business Strategy and Federal Protection 69
Historical Development 69
Conclusion 72
9 Manitoba: Public Enterprise Accompanied by Regulation 73
The Expropriation of Bell Canada’s Manitoba Operations 73
Competition between Private and Public Utilities in the Electrical Industry 75
Conclusion 79
10 The Creation of Ontario Hydro: The Franchise Contract Repudiated 83
Historical Development 83
The Demise of the Franchise Contract 83
The Private Sector 86
Emergence of Ontario Hydro 87
Opportunism 88
The Conmee Clause 88
The Power Generating Clause 89
Protection from Judicial Review 90
The Disposition of the Toronto Electric Light Company and the Toronto Railway Company 91
Conclusion 93
11 Utilities in Quebec from 1890 to 1935: Unfettered Development in Electricity Accompanied by Cost of Service Regulation for the Transit Industry 95
Historical Developments in Montral 95
Regulatory History 97
The Evolution of the Montreal Tramways Contract 98
Quebec City: 1929-35 99
Conclusion 100
12 Conclusion 103
The Choice of Regulatory Instrument 103
The Theory of Instrument Choice 105
Notes 109
List of Tables 117
Bibliography 119
9780773545977
$40.95 CAD
Paperback
