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Truth |
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Pascal Engel provides a concise presentation and discussion of contemporary philosophical issues in the theory of truth.
After a brief presentation of the classical conceptions of truth - correspondence, coherence, verificationist, and pragmatist theories - the book focuses on the debate between those who favour "substantive" conceptions of this classical kind and those who advocate so-called "minimalist" and "deflationist" conceptions and deny that truth can be any more than a thin concept, carrying no metaphysical weight.
Engel argues that, although the minimalist conception of truth is basically right, it does not follow that truth can be eliminated from our philosophical thinking, as is claimed by some radical deflationists. In particular, he shows that some deflationist views have a definitively relativist and "postmodernist" ring and should be rejected. Even if a metaphysically substantive theory of truth has little chance to succeed, he argues, truth plays a central role as a norm or guiding value of our rational inquiries and practices in the philosophy of knowledge and in ethics.
Engel argues that, although the minimalist conception of truth is basically right, it does not follow that truth can be eliminated from our philosophical thinking, as is claimed by some radical deflationists. In particular, he shows that some deflationist views have a definitively relativist and "postmodernist" ring and should be rejected. Even if a metaphysically substantive theory of truth has little chance to succeed, he argues, truth plays a central role as a norm or guiding value of our rational inquiries and practices in the philosophy of knowledge and in ethics.
Details
Part of the Central Problems of Philosophy Series (number 4 in series)
192 Pages, 5 x 7
ISBN 9780773524613
September 2002
Formats: Cloth, Paperback, eBook
". . . well-informed, giving a judicious view of a great deal of the recent work on truth. Engel keeps the reader's interest throughout, the discussions are clear and helpful, and students both at introductory and at quite advanced levels will be very grateful for it." Simon Blackburn, University of Cambridge
"The book exhibits a remarkable breadth of philosophical spectrum and intellectual richness - which is rarely seen in books of similar character. It is refreshing to come across a work on contemporary theories of propositional truth that situates the discussion within a well-informed but non-digressive historical framework. Engel convincingly gestures towards a viable synthesis that avoids the metaphysical extravagancies of the traditional substantive theories of truth while reaffirming its verification-transcendent status." Murat Bac, Philosophy, Dalhousie University
"The book exhibits a remarkable breadth of philosophical spectrum and intellectual richness - which is rarely seen in books of similar character. It is refreshing to come across a work on contemporary theories of propositional truth that situates the discussion within a well-informed but non-digressive historical framework. Engel convincingly gestures towards a viable synthesis that avoids the metaphysical extravagancies of the traditional substantive theories of truth while reaffirming its verification-transcendent status." Murat Bac, Philosophy, Dalhousie University
Pascal Engel is professor of philosophy at the University of Paris IV-Sorbonne.
Preface vii
Introduction: Truth lost? 1
1 Classical theories of truth 9
1.1 A preliminary map 9
1.2 Correspondence 14
1.3 Coherence 26
1.4 Verificationism 29
1.5 Pragmatism 34
1.6 The identity theory 37
2 Deflationism 41
2.1 Varieties of deflationism 41
2.2 Redundancy and disquotation 43
2.3 Tarski's semantic theory 47
2.4 Horwich's deflationist minimalism 50
2.5 The false modesty of deflationism 54
2.6 Rorty, Nietzsche and Heidegger 60
3 Minimal realism 65
3.1 Wright's minimal anti-realism 66
3.2 Putnam's "natural realism" 75
3.3 Truth and truth-aptness 81
3.4 Minimal realism stated 87
3.5 Minimal realism and the norm of knowledge 92
4 The realist/anti-realist controversies 99
4.1 Theoretical truths in science 100
4.2 Truth in ethics 105
4.3 Mathematical truth 112
4.4 Realism vindicated 117
5 The norm of truth 125
5.1 Truth and normativity 126
5.2 The ethics of belief 131
5.3 Cognitive suicide 136
5.4 What's wrong with relativism 140
Conclusion: Truth regained 147
Notes 151
Bibliography 161
Index 173
