What does it mean when a judge in a court of law uses the phrase “common sense”? Is it a type of evidence or a mode of reasoning? In a world character- ized by material and political inequalities, whose common sense should in- form the law? Common Sense and Legal Judgment explores this rhetorically powerful phrase, arguing that common sense, when invoked in political and legal dis- courses without adequate reflection, poses a threat to the quality and legiti- macy of legal judgment. Often operating in the service of conservatism, populism, or majoritarianism, common sense can harbour stereotypes, repro- duce unjust power relations, and silence marginalized people. Nevertheless, drawing the works of theorists such as Thomas Reid, Antonio Gramsci, and Hannah Arendt into conversation with rulings by the Supreme Court of Canada, Patricia Cochran demonstrates that with careful attention, the demo- cratic, egalitarian, and community-sustaining aspects of common sense can be brought to light. A call for critical self-reflection and the close scrutiny of power relationships and social contexts, this book is a direct response to social justice predicaments and their confounding relationships to law. Creative and interdisciplinary, Common Sense and Legal Judgment rein- vigorates feminist and anti-poverty understandings of judgment, knowledge, justice, and accountability. Patricia Cochran is assistant professor in the Faculty of Law at the University of Victoria. Most states are multination states, and most peoples are stateless peoples. Just as collectives can behave as sovereign states only if they are recognized by the international community, liberal multination states must recognize stateless peoples in order to determine their political status within that state. There is, however, no agreement on the kind of principles that should be considered, especially under classical liberalism, which gives individuals preeminence over groups. Liberal theories that attempt to accommodate collective rights are often based on a comprehensive version of liberalism that subscribes to moral indi- vidualism. Within such a framework, they develop a watered-down concept of collective rights. In A Liberal Theory of Collective Rights Michel Seymour explores the theoretical resources of John Rawls’s political liberalism and shows that this particular approach can accommodate genuine collective rights. By Rawls’s account, Seymour explains, peoples are moral agents and sources of valid moral claims and are therefore entitled to collective rights. These kinds of rights translate, in the constitution of the multination state, to a true political recognition for stateless peoples. Ultimately, A Liberal Theory of Collective Rights answers three impor- tant questions: Who is the subject of collective rights? What is the object of collective rights? And can they be institutionalized in real politics? Michel Seymour is professor in the Department of Philosophy at l’Université de Montréal. 3 6 M Q U P F A L L 2 0 1 7 S P E C I F I C AT I O N S December 2017 978-0-7735-5089-6 $39.95A CDN, $39.95A US, £34.00 paper 978-0-7735-5088-9 $120.00S CDN, $120.00S US, £103.00 cloth 6 x 9 280pp eBook available S P E C I F I C AT I O N S Democracy, Diversity, and Citizen Engagement Series December 2017 978-0-7735-5117-6 $34.95A CDN, $34.95A US, £29.99 paper 978-0-7735-5116-9 $110.00S CDN, $110.00S US, £95.00 cloth 6 x 9 296pp eBook available Common Sense and Legal Judgment Community Knowledge, Political Power, and Rhetorical Practice patricia cochran An analysis of the surprisingly inscrutable idea of “common sense”and its relationship to reflective and accountable legal judgment. P O L I T I C A L S T U D I E S • P O L I T I C A L P H I L O S O P H Y L A W A Liberal Theory of Collective Rights michel seymour An original contribution to the politics of recognition and the theory of collective rights.